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Prelude to a Dialogue:
A Response to Kenneth Collins
Randy L. Maddox
I am honored to be taking part in this collegial dialogue with Kenneth
Collins over our respective approaches to interpreting John Wesley’s
soteriology. I consider it particularly fitting that our dialogue should be set in
the annual meeting of the Wesleyan Theological Society. It is a sign of the
growing respect for and influence of the WTS that work by two long-time
members should be at the center of current discussion in broader Wesley
Studies circles.
The purpose of a community of scholars like the WTS is to nurture new
insights and approaches, and to foster dialogue over the relative adequacy of
resulting proposals. While proponents may take lead roles in such dialogue, the
crucial discerning role is played by the scholarly community as a whole. In its
probing the community helps individual scholars to uncover our
presuppositions, clarify our ambiguities, recognize our limitations, and
finetune our proposals. Out of such work comes the best hope for progress
toward scholarly consensus on the topics under consideration. I know that I
have benefitted greatly from the questions and challenges that many of you
have posed to my proposals concerning Wesley’s characteristic theological
convictions and concern.
No one has been more faithful in offering my work such engagement
than Ken, and none have developed alternative proposals that are as
comprehensive and thoroughly-researched. Ken’s numerous publications have
rightly earned him a reputation as a leading interpreter of
1Cf. Kenneth J. Collins, The Scripture Way of Salvation: The Heart of John Wesley’s
Theology (Nashville, TN: Abingdon, 1997), 141.
2Cf. Randy L. Maddox, Responsible Grace: John Wesley’s Practical Theology (Nash-
ville, TN: Kingswood Books, 1994), 127, 155.
3Collins, Scripture Way of Salvation, 205–207.
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Wesley’s soteriology. Ken and I have dialogued over differences of
interpretation on individual issues in the past, and I think we made some
progress in understanding one another better. The best example is the question
of how Wesley understood the “faith of a servant” in his later years. Ken raised
questions about my suggestion that there was evidence the later Wesley saw
the “faith of a servant” as saving faith. In the process of our dialogue we both
admitted that the evidence was ambiguous. Ken’s concern was to insist that not
all of the later Wesley’s references to “faith of a servant” are positive, a point
that he takes to suggest that the few positive references relate to exceptional
situations.1 My concern was to insist that not all of the references were
negative (as they had been earlier), a change that I take to apply more broadly
than to just a few exceptional cases.2 We agree that for the later Wesley not
every one with the “faith of a servant” was lost, nor was everyone with such
faith necessarily saved. While we continue to differ on the specific nuance of
the “faith of a servant,” we agree on the important point that Wesley always
encouraged those with this faith to keep seeking the deeper assurance that
characterizes the “faith of a son.”
A Basic Difference in Approaches: “Cunjunctive” vs. “Perspectival”
 As I understand it, the goal of this dialogue is broader than
consideration of such individual matters. Ken and I have been invited to reflect
on each other’s overall approach to interpreting Wesley, giving particular
attention to our sense of the most basic way in which this approach differs
from our own. I am aided in my half of this task by Ken’s articulate conclusion
to his recent book on Wesley’s soteriology.3 He properly stresses how his
presentation moves beyond the many predecessors that have highlighted
Wesley’s similarities to one or another theological tradition. Instead Ken
strives to demonstrate that Wesley’s soteriology is truly “conjunctive” in
nature, presenting a “well-crafted and intentional synthesis” of the many
different emphases found in Scripture, and thus within the family of Christian
traditions. This is an ambitious goal, and one with which I am deeply
sympathetic. My work focuses as well on highlighting 
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how Wesley weaves together emphases that are too often isolated or
counterposed in Christian debate. But as I have pursued Wesley’s distinctive
interweaving of these emphases I have come to doubt that it is best captured by
the model of an ideally balanced conjunction of divergent elements.
The foundational assumption of a model of conjunction is that the
elements being joined do not include fundamental options that either negate or
subsume their alternatives. Items of difference are viewed instead as counter-
balancing poles of a continuum between which one can gravitate to an ideally-
balanced synthesis. This assumption surely fits the focal elements in some
classical Christian debates, but it does not fit universally. The reason for this is
that in many classical debates the issue at focus is not whether contending
elements should be interrelated, it is disagreement over which element should
be considered most fundamental—providing the overarching emphasis that
subsumes the important truths of the other elements into its larger pattern.
If I understand Ken rightly, he considers the focus of the latter debates
to be unfortunate, inevitably leading to less than adequate conjunctions of
Christian truth. I believe the focus of these debates is instead natural, and
indeed commendable. It reflects the deeply human nature of theological
reflection. As meaning-seeking beings we inevitably desire some orienting
coherence among our various convictions. As finite and socially-located
beings, our sense of this coherence concerning divine truths will finally be
perspectival in nature. We can—and should—continually test and enrich our
perspective by ongoing dialogue with others, but we cannot rise above all
perspectives to some ideal conjunctive synthesis.
I could no doubt stop here and we could dialogue just about theoretical
models of human theological reflection, but that is not the focal purpose of this
event. Besides, such dialogues carried on in the abstract usually prove
intractable. Test cases are more helpful, and our respective readings of Wesley
offer such a test case. While Ken has tried to demonstrate that Wesley’s
soteriology offers a conjunctive synthesis of the range of Christian
divergences, I have argued that it embodies a more perspectival interweaving.
To develop this point a bit, I contend that some of the most important
differences between Eastern and Western Christian soteriology are
perspectival in nature. They are not disagreements about affirming one element
of Christian truth or another but about which elements are most
4Ibid., 206–207.
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fundamental; that is, which provide the thematic background against which the
other elements add their distinctive accents. In Responsible Grace I offer a
reading of Wesley as one who: (1) was raised in the ecumenical richness and
ambiguity of eighteenth-century Anglicanism; (2) gravitated toward the
Eastern emphases mediated through Anglicanism during his Oxford years,
making them most foundational to his soteriology; (3) developed a heightened
appreciation for Western distinctives in the events surrounding 1738;
(4) moved increasingly over the next decades to integrate these Western
distinctives into his foundational Eastern commitments; (5) repeatedly found it
difficult to explain this integrated position in Western terms to his Western
opponents; and (6) was not always successful in working out the integration
himself. In this last regard I sometimes propose refinements of Wesley’s
statements, suggest further applications of his principles, and point directions
that Wesley’s heirs might move in fleshing out his “orienting concern.”
Obviously there is much here that can be the subject of debate. Even
those who agree with my overall interpretive approach can question my
proposed refinements, applications, and the like. At a more general level, those
who agree that interpreters of Wesley must finally cast either the
characteristically Eastern or Western elements of his theological convictions as
most foundational to his overall theology can debate my option for the Eastern.
And at the most general level we can debate whether such a choice is either
necessary or desirable. Whatever our other disagreements, where Ken and I
appear to disagree most fundamentally is at this level. In championing
Wesley’s theology as a conjunctive synthesis he charges that giving primacy in
Wesley’s theology to the emphases of one theological tradition over another
(as I have done) inevitably distorts it.4
Ken’s charge will be compelling precisely to the degree that he is
successful in offering a truly even-handed conjunctive reading of Wesley. For
if I am right about the perspectival nature of some of the central Christian
debates concerning soteriology, then not only did Wesley have to opt at points
for either a foundationally Eastern or Western perspective but interpreters of
his theology are faced with the same choice. Finally they must make either the
Western emphases in Wesley’s theology most fundamental (working Eastern
emphases into this larger pattern) or the
5Maddox, Responsible Grace, 65–67, 73–77, 82–84, 86, 141–43.
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Eastern emphases most fundamental (working Western emphases into this
larger pattern).
The “Western” Perspective of Collin’s Reading of Wesley
This leads to my basic suggestion that what Ken actually provides in
his recent work is the most nuanced reading yet of Wesley from a
foundationally Western perspective. He is particularly adept at showing the
inadequacy of one-sidedly “Protestant” or “Catholic” readings of Wesley
within this larger Western orientation. But it appears to me that he is less even-
handed with more characteristically Eastern emphases, tending to subsume
them (as I have argued is natural, one way or the other) within the preferred
Western commitments. Since this evaluation dissents from Ken’s stated goal, I
will devote my remaining comments to some examples that I believe point out
the Western orientation of Ken’s reading.
I will not take the time to repeat here the full sketches I offer in
Responsible Grace of the different emphases concerning human nature, the
fundamental human problem, and the central focus of salvation that came to
characterize dominant voices in Eastern and Western Christianity.5 I
capsulized these differences there by talking of the West’s “juridical”
emphasis in comparison with the East’s “therapeutic” emphasis. Like all short
labels, these two have their limitations. What I intended them to convey is that
Western Christianity has tended to make the soteriological issues of guilt and
forgiveness foundational to all others, while Eastern Christianity has tended to
make the issues of spiritual impairment and healing most foundational. But this
is a matter of relative emphasis, not of exclusive treatment. Both sets of issues
are biblical, and both branches of the church have classically fit the other set
within the larger context of their focal emphasis.
This means that the distinction between “Western” and “Eastern”
soteriology is not the simple equivalent of the distinction between justification
and sanctification. The mainstream of both branches affirm both of these
dimensions of salvation. Their difference lays not in the inclusion or exclusion
of any dimension of soteriology, but in what serves as the “defining”
dimension, casting other items in terms of its concerns and overtones. For the
West this defining dimension has been justification, 
6Ibid., 78–81
7See Collins, Scripture Way of Salvation, 32–34.
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bringing a juridical overtone to the various aspects of soteriology; for the East
it has been sanctification, bringing a therapeutic overtone to the same.
Example of Cause or Rationale for Depravity
To see how this plays out, take the question of human depravity after
the Fall. Both branches normatively affirm this depravity. Moreover, debates
about the extent of our depravity are less centered between branches than
within the Western branch. Where the branches do differ is in their sense of the
overall cause or rationale for depravity—the West viewing it more as our
deserved punishment for the unmitigated guilt of the Original Sin, the East
viewing it more as an inevitable debilitating consequence of our foolish and
arrogant withdrawal from an enlivening relationship with God. The impact of
this difference is that the East can hardly conceive that we could restore
relationship with God without this counteracting significantly our spiritual
debilitation, while the West has had to contend through its history with
marginal voices that insist justification does little to offset our continuing
sentence of depravity (“Christians are not different, just forgiven”).
How does this relate to Wesley, and our respective readings of Wesley?
Both Ken and I note that Wesley’s suggestions about the cause of depravity
underwent fluctuation. I have highlighted how his concern manifest in these
fluctuations parallels that of the Eastern tradition, and argue that the late
Wesley settled upon a stance closer to the Eastern therapeutic model than to
Western juridical emphases.6 By contrast Ken’s discussion of this topic
includes no mention of the alternative Eastern approach. He emphasizes solely
Wesley’s similarities to the Western (Augustinian) model, then naturally—and
quite properly—has to stress how Wesley protected against the potential
antinomian distortions of this model.7 This seems less a “conjunctive” reading
than a very nuanced placing of Wesley within the mainstream of Western
concerns.
Example of the Basic Meaning of “Grace”
If distinct emphases concerning the cause and rationale of our
fundamental human problem (depravity) are one expression of the perspectival 
8The best example is Sermon 12, “The Witness of Our Spirit,” §§15–16, Works 1:309–10.
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differences of Eastern and Western Christian soteriology, another is found in
their distinct emphases about God’s grace as the fundamental solution to this
problem.
A primary focus on the issue of guilt has inclined the Western church
to define grace most eminently as the unmerited favor of God manifest in
bestowing pardon for our sin (and for many, in imputing an extrinsic holiness
that fits us for glory). With this starting point the West has continually had to
address the pastoral danger of emphasizing the unmerited nature of our pardon
and/or the extrinsic nature of our imputed holiness in such a fashion as to
undercut any role for Christian obedience. The main way of protecting against
this has been to insist that God also graciously infuses some “power” for holy
living in pardoned believers. The exact nature and extent of that power has
been subject to much debate. More importantly, the emphasis on power for
holy living (or observing the law in Christian life) has repeatedly provoked
among Western Christians fears about reverting to works righteousness rather
than relying on “grace alone.” The most sophisticated resolution of this fear is
to call for counterbalancing grace as unmerited favor with grace as power
(often seen as a balancing of Protestant and Roman Catholic emphases).
While sympathetic with the goals of this resolution, Eastern Christians
find its polar logic puzzling. Their primary focus on the issue of the spiritual
debility resulting from our separation from God has inclined them to define
grace most eminently as the healing energy of God’s restored presence in our
lives. They fully agree that God’s pardoning initiative in restoring this
presence is wholly undeserved, but they concentrate attention on the inherent
purpose of grace to awaken and nurture loving response. Most importantly,
they see no reason to cast this empowering effect over against the “gratuitous”
nature of grace. Quite the contrary—the more we are transformed by
participating in God’s healing presence, the more deeply we realize how weak
and undeserving we are in our own right.
Wesley repeatedly conjoins affirmations of grace as unmerited mercy
with insistence that grace is also power for holy living.8 Ken rightly stresses
this and presents it as an example of Wesley balancing in a nuanced fashion
Protestant and broadly Catholic (Greek and Roman [his
9Collins, Scripture Way of Salvation, 19–20.
10E.g., Kenneth J. Collins, “The New Birth: John Wesley’s Doctrine,” Wesleyan
Theological Journal 32.1 (1997): 53–68, p. 65.
11Maddox, Responsible Grace, 86, 119–22.
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addition]) emphases.9 But I would suggest that his model of Wesley’s
“balance” remains perspectivally Western. To begin with, he operates within
the Western assumption of a polar relationship between grace as unmerited
favor and grace as power, framing his arguments in terms of the need to bring
one or the other pole back into the picture. And his most passionate arguments
are characteristically devoted to the danger that discussions of empowering
works of grace will fail to keep focal the notion of grace as the unmerited favor
of God, rather than to the polar alternative danger.10 In other words, when
pushed he subtly privileges the notion of grace as “unmerited favor” over that
of grace as “healing energy.”
This in no way questions Ken’s stated desire to truly integrate these
two (or show that Wesley does so), but it may raise the question of why this
proves so difficult. Eastern theologians have long suggested that what actually
undermines this desirable goal in Western soteriology is the broad Western
tendency to view grace as some created “thing” God bestows rather than as
God’s very “presence” shared with us. All created gifts will inevitably be
partial, while God’s restored presence can have truly holistic affect on our
lives. Thus, from an Eastern perspective the most crucial question of all about
grace is whether it is a “created” or “uncreated” reality. I have argued that
Wesley clearly joins the East is seeing grace as fundamentally God’s presence
restored in the Holy Spirit, not some “thing” given to us, and that this is
foundational to Wesley’s holistic understanding of salvation.11 By contrast,
Ken never directly engages the debate between the East and West on this issue.
By default his discussion retains the “created grace” overtones of the Western
Augustinian tradition, even though I see hints of his uncomfortableness with
this.
Example of Assumptions about Divine/Human Cooperation
Another place where the perspectival differences of Eastern and
Western Christian soteriology shine through is in their respective levels of
comfort with emphasizing human cooperation with divine grace in salvation. It
is well known that Eastern Christianity has never been comfortable with a
model of unilateral salvation as found in some Western traditions that affirm
unconditional election/reprobation. But most in the West have 
12See esp. Collins, Scripture Way of Salvation, 44, 73, 154.
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chafed at these models as well, insisting on some role for requisite human
cooperation in the process of salvation. The way in which the resulting
Western debates have been framed is telling. The concern is always raised that
stress on a requisite role for human cooperation in salvation leads to “works-
righteousness,” or the human attempt to “merit” our justification. There are
two things to note here, both flowing out of the juridical perspective of the
West: First, it is assumed that the decisive soteriological question is “Why are
we forgiven?” Second, it is assumed that the necessary condition for
forgiveness being gratuitous is the absence of all human agency at some
crucial point (i.e., divine and human agency are finally cast in polar relation,
just as were grace/mercy and grace/power). The strength of these assumptions
is such that even those Western traditions (like the Arminian) which stress
most the role of human cooperation in salvation take for granted that there
must be at least a brief initial moment of Divine unilateral action to preserve
the gratuity of salvation.
Once again, the Eastern branch of the Christian family has tended to be
puzzled by this way of putting the issues. Their therapeutic perspective casts
the issues in a very different light. For them the most decisive soteriological
question is “How are we healed?” In this realm the suggestion that expectation
of our continual cooperation with the Great Physician’s ministrations might
reflect a lack of trust in the gratuity of salvation makes little sense. Rather, any
lack of cooperation is more likely to be censured as revealing ingratitude for
the indispensable aid the Physician is freely offering. The issue at stake in our
cooperation is not whether we can “merit” what we have received, but whether
we will live faithfully in the life-giving regimen designed by our
Physician—or neglect it to the detriment of our spiritual health.
In terms of these issues Ken reads Wesley as the epitome of the
nuanced Western position. While he highlights and defends Wesley’s
“synergism,” he consistently stresses that Wesley also affirmed God’s
unilateral action at the decisive moments in the via salutis on the specific
grounds that this insured salvation was a “pure gift.”12 I concur entirely with
Ken on this point about what Wesley actually says. But while Ken heartily
endorses Wesley’s affirmation, this is one of those places where I would
suggest that Wesley was retaining a Western assumption that is not essential to
his more characteristic Eastern perspec-
13Consider the analogy of the Cosmological Argument for God’s existence, where it has
long been recognized throughout the church that God’s role as “First Cause” is more an
ontological claim about God’s ongoing relation to all events than a temporal claim about God’s
relation to the origination of the universe.
14The clearest examples are in the NT Notes comment on Acts 5:31; Letter to Charles
Wesley (27 January 1767), Letters (Telford) 5:39; and Letter to Ann Loxdale (12 July 1782),
Letters (Telford) 7:129.
15Cf. Farther Appeal to Men of Reason and Religion, Pt. I, §I.5, Works 11:107.
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tive. Like many in the Eastern tradition, it is not clear to me why unilateral
action by God is necessarily more expressive of the “prevenience” of grace to
all human response (which is what Wesley wants to maintain) than is ongoing
cooperant interaction between God and humanity.13 In either case we can
surely say with Wesley that we are able to “put to work” only what God is
already “working” within us.
Let me develop this point in terms of one of the practical embodiments
of this theoretical issue: the relative valuation given to instantaneous and more
gradual transitions in Christian life. The connection between these two issues
is the common (but debatable) assumption that divine unilateral action must be
instantaneous—as a necessary correlate of God’s omnipotence and freedom
from temporality. On this assumption, it is typically considered crucial from
the Western perspective to insist that at least some transitions in Christian life
are theologically instantaneous (because gratuitous) whether they are
experienced that way psychologically or not. There has also been some
tendency to privilege psychological models that highlight instantaneous
transitions. With its refusal to privilege unilateral action as the sole (or even
prime) expression of God’s prevenience, it is logical that the Eastern
perspective would also question the assumption that instantaneous transitions
are theologically necessary in Christian life. But they are not logically
impelled to reject the theological possibility or demean psychological
experiences of instantaneous transitions, nor do they typically do so. Their
insistence is that all of God’s salvific work is cooperant—whatever form it
might take.
It is not hard to document that Wesley embraced the standard Western
assumption that instantaneous transitions are the necessary correlate of the
gratuitous nature of salvation.14 But in debate over these issues he also
conceded that he was not so much defending a psychological model of these
transitions as a theological evaluation of them.15 Building on this point, I
argued that the mature Wesley was moving toward a more funda-
16Cf. Maddox, Responsible Grace, 153–54.
17See esp. Kenneth J. Collins, “Real Christianity as the Integrating Theme in Wesley’s
Soteriology: The Critique of a Modern Myth,” Asbury Theological Journal 51 (1996): 15–43, p.
28; “The New Birth,” 63 n35, & 64–67; and Scripture Way of Salvation, 99, 228 n160, & 232
n89.
18Let me note in this regard that when I proposed that Wesley treated Prevenient Grace as
the most nascent degree of regeneration or salvation (Responsible Grace, 159–60) I was working
within this holistic conception of salvation. The salvific affect of Prevenient Grace makes
possible but in no way guarantees or precludes the necessity of embracing God’s offered pardon
and the assurance this brings of eschatological salvation. Cf. Collins, “New Birth,” 27; and
Scripture Way of Salvation, 40, 237 n79
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mentally Eastern view of instantaneous transitions—where they are honored
but not viewed as the sole or mandatory expression of God’s gracious
prevenient work in our lives.16 At least implicitly I also suggested that
Wesley’s heirs should consider continuing to move in this direction. Ken has
vigorously critiqued this reading of Wesley and its implied suggestion.17 I fully
understand his concerns. They are precisely the right concerns to raise from a
nuanced, but still fundamentally Western, perspective.
Example of Definitions of Salvation
Let me touch briefly on just one more example. What difference do
their alternative perspectives make to how salvation itself is understood in
Eastern and Western branches of Christianity? Within their juridical
perspective Western Christians make justification the defining “core” of
salvation, and often seem to simply equate the two. As one result they typically
are very concerned to maintain precise dividing lines between anything that
might precede the moment of justification (as not yet “saving”) and anything
that follows it (as not “meriting” justification). Within their therapeutic
perspective Eastern Christians make the recovery of health the defining “core”
of salvation, readily equating the two. By this they intend most immediately
the recovery of spiritual health (sanctification or deification), but they insist
that God also works salvifically to affect every dimension of human life to
some degree in our present circumstances. Thus, they are very willing to talk
about degrees of “salvation” which precede (and make possible) one’s
responsive trust in God’s offered pardon—a response that is the condition of
one’s ultimate or eschatological “salvation.”18
It was precisely Wesley’s characteristic definitions of salvation that
first suggested to me his foundationally Eastern perspective. To quote what is
perhaps the most articulate example:
19Farther Appeal to Men of Reason and Religion, Pt. I, §3, Works 11:106.
20See esp. Collins, Scripture Way of Salvation, 108–109.
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By salvation I mean, not barely (according to the vulgar notion)
deliverance from hell, or going to heaven, but a present
deliverance from sin, a restoration of the soul to its primitive
health, its original purity; a recovery of the divine nature; the
renewal of our souls after the image of God in righteousness
and true holiness, in justice, mercy, and truth.19
Here it seems obvious that Wesley makes healing the defining “core” of
salvation and views the role of justification precisely from this vantage. Yet
Ken argues at some length that Wesley’s vantage point for viewing the whole
scope of salvation is instead justification.20 While he goes on to protect
carefully an essential place for sanctification, the overall effect seems less a
“balance” than a casting of Wesley’s therapeutic emphases within a
foundationally Western perspective.
Conclusion
Hopefully these are enough examples to suggest why I believe that
what Ken actually provides in his recent work is a reading of Wesley from a
foundationally Western perspective. As I said earlier, it is the most nuanced
such reading yet. And it is clearly a very plausible reading. But finally I do not
find it as adequate as a reading that makes the Eastern elements of Wesley’s
soteriology most fundamental. Of course my opinion is of limited value in
itself. This is an issue for corporate discernment, and I will be content if I have
helped stimulate yet further dialogue in the service of this discernment.
